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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
n the first of two consolidated appeals (Supreme Court Docket No. 39594), 
Dennis L. Nielson appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
claim, alleged in his initial petition for post-conviction relief, that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request both a psychological evaluation to determine 
Nielson's competency prior to trial, and a mental health evaluation prior to 
sentencing. 
Nielson also appeals from the summary dismissal of his successive petition 
for post-conviction relief (Supreme Court Docket No. 40446), in which he reasserted 
"competency evaluation" claim and also claimed his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to make an offer of proof which would have preserved for appeal a 
challenge to the trial court's ruling that, if Nielson testified, the state could present 
evidence of other bad acts under I.RE. 404(b). 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
A. Underlying Criminal Proceeding 
In 2006, the state charged Nielson with committing, in 2002, lewd conduct 
with a minor under sixteen by having manual to genital contact with a seven year-old 
female, N.B. (#33823 R., pp.14-15. 1) At a pre-trial hearing held on October 27, 
2006, Nielson asked to have his appointed counsel dismissed and to represent 
himself at trial. (#40446 R., pp.28-42.) During that hearing, Nielson informed the 
1 The trial transcript is Exhibit D in Supreme Court Docket No. 39594, and Exhibit J 
in Supreme Court Docket No. 40446 (#40446 R., pp.27-115). 
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court that, sometime during the past year, he had experienced psychotic events 
which caused him to give his ex-wife power of attorney to assist him, and that he 
had been released from the prison mental facility back into the prison general 
population about six weeks before and prescribed medication. (#40446 R., pp.29, 
35.) According to Nielson, he was placed in the mental facility after having a 
psychotic break, and was later released because he was not "crazy" or a danger to 
himself or others. (#40446 R., p.35.) After the court determined that Nielson was 
competent to stand trial (#40446 R., p.43), and extensively questioned him about the 
dynamics of self-representation (id., pp.37 -40), the court granted Nielson's motion to 
represent himself, with prior counsel acting as standby counsel (id.). 
On the first day of trial, November 13, 2006, Nielson moved for a continuance 
on the basis that he allegedly was diagnosed with schizophrenia by a Dr. Kruzich, 
and that he was not competent to prepare and assist in his own defense, or to 
represent himself at trial. (#40446 R., p.43.) The court asked Nielson if he had a 
signed letter from Dr. Kruzich stating Nielson is schizophrenic, and when Nielson 
said he did not, the court denied his motion. (#40446 R., p.43.) Shortly after that 
ruling was made, Nielson asked to have his stand-by counsel be re-assigned as his 
trial counsel, which request was granted. (#40446, p.45.) 
At trial, the district court ruled that, if Nielson testified, the state would be 
allowed to present rebuttal evidence under l.R.E. 404(b) showing Nielson had 
previously had sexual contact with two other young girls, Summer H. and Stephanie 
C. (#39594 R., pp.32-33, 364; #40446 R., pp.223-225.) Nielson did not testify at 
trial, nor did he make an offer of proof of what his testimony would have been. 
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(#39594 R., p.364; #40446, pp.260-261.) The jury convicted N of lewd 
conduct with a minor under sixteen, and court imposed a unified fifty-year 
sentence with thirty years fixed. State v. Nielson, 2008 \NL 948544 (Idaho App. 
2008) (unpublished) Nielson appealed, contending the court erred in (1) rulings 
concerning his pro se status, (2) denying motions for an updated presentence 
investigative report and a psychosexual evaluation, and (3) imposing an excessive 
sentence. 1st, p.4. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Nielson's conviction and 
sentence. Id. 
B. Initial Post-Conviction Proceeding -- Supreme Court Docket No. 39594 
In November 2009, Nielson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, an 
"Affidavit of Transcripts and Exhibits in Support of Post Conviction Petition," and a 
motion for appointment of counsel. (#39594 R., pp.7-94.) The court granted 
Nielson's motion for appointed counsel. (#39594 R., p.96.) After the state filed an 
answer to the petition (#39594 R., pp.108-117), Nielson's counsel filed an amended 
petition (id., pp.141-141), claiming, intera/ia, that (1) Nielson's trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to file "a motion for a competency evaluation prior to 
trial pursuant to Idaho Code 18-211" (id., p.147), (2) Nielson's trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to file "a motion for a mental health evaluation prior 
to sentencing pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2523" (id., p.148), and (3) Nielson's 
counsel on direct appeal "was ineffective in failing to appeal the 404(B) [sic] ruling in 
3 
the present case, although the same issue was being appealed in Grist v. State of 
ldaho"2 (id., p.149). 
The state filed an answer to the amended petition (#39594 R., pp.173-180) 
and a motion for summary dismissal (id., pp.181-182). After the parties filed 
additional briefs and affidavits (#39594 R, pp.200-208, 218-241, 246-266), the 
district court held a hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal (see 
generally 1 /27 /11 Tr., pp.5-36). After the hearing, the court issued a written decision 
summarily dismissing Nielson's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to file a motion for a competency evaluation, explaining, "there has been no showing 
here that he lacked the mental capacity to assist in his own defense and to 
understand the proceedings."3 (#39594 R., pp.266-267.) The court also held that 
"[t]he same is true of [Nielson's) claim that an I.C. § 19-2523 evaluation would have 
changed the outcome of the sentencing or the outcome of the case. There is 
nothing in the record to show that Mr. Nielson is mentally ill now or in the past." 
(#39594 R., p.267.) 
In regard to Nielson's claim that his direct appeal attorney failed to challenge 
the trial court's 404(b) ruling, the district court stated it "will allow that portion of the 
2 State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009). 
3 With regard to dismissal of Nielson's "competency evaluation" claim, the district 
court also stated: 
If Mr. Nielson can show to the Court that he was schizophrenic and not 
able to appreciate or understand the proceedings, that his counsel was 
aware of that diagnosis, and such a diagnosis exists, perhaps then the 
Defendant can amend his pleadings to reflect such facts. 
(#39594 R., p.267.) 
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remain and will require evidence to be forthcoming on that issue. 
, p.267.) The state filed a motion to reconsider its motion for summary 
a medical evidence claim unrelated to the claims in 
(#39594 R., pp.270-301.) After further discovery was permitted on that claim (id., 
p.312), the state filed a post-discovery motion for summary dismissal of all the 
remaining claims in Nielson's petition (id., pp.316-344). Nielson responded by filing 
"Another Reply Memorandum [etc.]" (id., pp.345-353), and the state filed an 
objection to that reply, stating in relevant part, "[a] reasonably competent appellant 
attorney would never have appealed this [404(b)] issue in Nielson's case 
because it was not preserved for appeal[,]" and [t]here would have been 
absolutely no record for an appellate court to evaluate about what Nielson would 
have testified' (id., p.358 (bold and italics original)). At a status conference, "[t]he 
parties submitted the issues . . . upon their written motions and responsive 
pleadings, and the Court took the matter under advisement." (#39594 R., p.362.) 
The district court subsequently entered a "Memorandum Decision on (1) 
Respondent's Motion to Reconsider Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Remaining Claim; (2) Respondent's Post-Discovery Motion for Dismissal of 
Remaining Claims; and (3) Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Amended Petition." (#39594 R., pp.360-374.) In summarily dismissing Nielson's 
claim that his direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial 
court's 404(b) ruling, the court held that Nielson failed to preserve the issue for direct 
appeal because he did not testify or make an offer of proof at trial as to what his 
testimony would have been; the court gave Nielson twenty days to submit an 
5 
amended petition, which he did not do. (#39594 R., pp.370-376.) Foilowing entry of 
the Judgment (#39594 R., p.381), Nielson timely appealed (#39594 R., pp.382-385, 
390-3934), challenging only the summary dismissal of hls claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request a competency evaluation (Appellant's Brief. pp18-
23). 
C. Successive Post-Conviction Proceeding -- Supreme Court Docket No.40446 
On July 10, 2012, Nielson filed a successive post-conviction petition alleging 
(1) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to preserve an 
appellate challenge to the trial court's 404(b) ruling by not making an offer of proof at 
trial about what Nielson's testimony would have been, (2) his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not asking the Court for a competency evaluation prior to trial and 
sentencing, and (3) Nielson was not barred by from presenting his claim in a 
successive post-conviction petition because his counsel in the first post-conviction 
proceeding was ineffective for failing to amend the petition to include such a claim. 
(#40446 R., pp.6-11.) 
The district court granted Nielson's motion for appointed counsel (#40446 R., 
pp.124-126, 128) and the state filed an answer and a motion (with a supporting brief) 
to summarily dismiss the successive petition (id., pp.130-140). The court filed a 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss Successive Petition (#40446 R., pp.154-165), and 
Nielson filed a notice of appeal from that notice (id. pp.282-285). However, the 
4 The Idaho Supreme Court ordered Nielson to file an amended notice of appeal, 
and later, a second amended notice of appeal, for failure to comply with I.A.R. 17(0). 
(2/2/12 "Order Re: Amended Notice of Appeal"; 2/13/12 "Second Order Re: 
Amended Notice of Appeal".) 
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Court remanded the case to the district court, noting the appeal was 
from the district court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss Successive Petition and that a 
final j had not been . (#40446 R., p.290.) Upon motion by Nielson, 
he was permitted to dismiss his attorney and proceed pro se. (#40446 R., pp.288-
289, 291-293.) However, twenty days later, the court appointed Nielson another 
attorney at his request. (#40446 R., pp.302-305.) 
Nielson's new attorney filed a response to the district court's earlier Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss Successive Petition (#40446 R., pp.401-411), an affidavit by 
Nielson of what his trial testimony would have been, and an affidavit by Nielson's 
direct appeal counsel explaining why he did not challenge the trial court's 404(b) 
ruling on appeal, as follows: 
I did not raise this issue on appeal because it was not properly 
preserved for appeal in that there was not an offer of proof made as to 
what Mr. Nielson's testimony would have been had the trial court not 
erred in admitting the 404(b) evidence. Accordingly, I was not able to 
show that Mr. Nielson was prejudiced in any way by the trial court's 
erroneous 404(b) ruling. 
(#40446 R., p.418.) 
On May 9, 2013, the district court entered a Judgment dismissing Nielson's 
successive post-conviction petition "for the reasons set forth in the Court's 
September 18, 2012 Notice of Intent to Dismiss. "5 (#40446 R., pp.420-421.) Based 
on the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the court summarily dismissed Nielson's claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a competency 
5 That same day, the district court entered an order granting Nielson's second 
request to take judicial notice of the Clerk's Record n the appeal of his underlying 
criminal case and the Clerk's Record in Nielson's initial post-conviction proceeding. 
(#40446 R., pp.422.) 
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evaluation prior to trial and sentencing on the ground that it was barred under I.C. § 
19-49086 because it had been previously raised and adjudicated in Nielson's initial 
post-conviction proceeding. (#40446 R., p.163.) 
In summarily dismissing Nielson's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to preserve the 404(b) issue for appeal, the district court explained: 
[E]even if appellate counsel would have raised the trial court's I.R.E. 
404(b) ruling as an issue on appeal, it is highly unlikely that an 
appellate court would have overturned the District Court's well-
reasoned ruling. Even if an appellate court did find that the District 
Court abused its discretion (in the I.R.E. 403 balancing) in permitting 
relevant other acts evidence to impeach the Petitioner, there is no 
reason to believe that this would have resulted in the appellate court 
overturning the conviction. 
(#40446 R., p.162.) The district court concluded that inasmuch as there was no 
merit to Nielson's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the 
404(b) issue for appeal, Nielson's "initial post-conviction counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to raise, as an issue in the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 
trial counsel's failure to make an offer of proof regarding [Nielson's] testimony at 
trial." (Id.) Therefore, Nielson's 404(b)-based ineffectiveness claim was barred from 
6 Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and provides: 
Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for relief availabie 
to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, 
supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated 
or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the 
proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other 
proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the 
basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for 
relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application. 
(Bold in original (emphasis added).) 
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being presented in a successive petition. (Id., pp.159-160, 163.) Nielson filed a 
timely appeal. (#40446 R.. pp.425-428.) The appeals in Supreme Court Docket 
Nos. 39594 and 40446 have been consolidated in this appeal. (8/12/13 Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Nielson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Nielson's 
initial petition for post-conviction relief because he did raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether counsel was ineffective in failing to 
request a competency evaluation? 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Nielson's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief because he did raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel was ineffective in 
not preserving the IRE 404(b) error for appeal and whether the district 
court denied him the right to testify by its erroneous ruling? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Nielson failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his post-conviction 
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency 
evaluation prior to trial and a mental health evaluation prior to sentencing? 
2. Has Nielson failed to establish that the district court erred in summarily 




Nielson Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Post-
Conviction Claims That His Trial Counsel \A/as Ineffective For Failina To Reauest A 
Competency Evaluation Prior To Trial And A Mental Health Evaluation Prior To 
Sentencing 
A Introduction 
Nielson filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency evaluation 
prior to trial pursuant to I.C. § 18-211, and a mental health evaluation prior to 
sentencing pursuant to I.C. § 19-2523. (#39594 R., pp.147-148.) The district court 
summarily dismissed Nielson's "competency evaluation" claim, stating, "there has 
been no showing here that he lacked the mental capacity to assist in his own 
defense and to understand the proceedings." (#39594 R., pp.266-267.) The court 
also summarily dismissed Nielson's "mental health evaluation" claim, explaining, 
[t]here is nothing in the record to show that Mr. Nielson is mentally ill now or in the 
past." (#39594 R., p.267.) 
Nielson argues on appeal that the summary dismissal of his two related 
claims was error (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-23), but his argument fails. 7 Nielson has 
failed to show on the record that he alleged facts or admissible evidence sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact as to his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
7 On appeal, Nielson bases his claim on trial counsel's alleged failure "to request a 
competency evaluation both before trail and before sentencing." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.19.) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissai of a post-conviction petition, the appellate 
court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of materiai fact exists, 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested 
relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); 
Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 7 49, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct App. 
1986). 
C. General Legal Standards Applicable To Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding, and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to 
relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Hassett v. 
State, 127 Idaho 313,315,900 P.2d 221,223 (Ct App. 1995). However, a petition 
for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition 
must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice 
for a complaint. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 
1995) (citing LRC.P. 8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within her 
personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support her allegations. kl 
(citing LC. § 19-4903). 
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction 
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, 
deemed true. Cooperv. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); 
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Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 88,741 P.2d 374,375 (Ct. App. 1987). However, 
the court is not required to accept the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier unsupported by admissible 
v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 
644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. 
Summary dismissal is akin to summary judgment. Hassett, 127 Idaho at 315, 900 
P.2d at 223 (citing I.R.C.P. 56). A claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to LC. § 19-4906 if the applicant "has not presented 
evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon 
which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Bera v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 
960 2d 738, 739 (1998); Roman, 125 Idaho at 647,873 P.2d at 901. 
Dismissal is proper where the evidence controverts an essential element of 
the applicant's claim or does not support relief as a matter of law. Cooper, 96 Idaho 
at 545, 531 P.2d at 1190; Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 878, 993 P.2d 1205, 1209 
(Ct. App. 2000). However, if an applicant presents a material factual issue, an 
evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 
P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991). 
D. General Legal Standards Concerning Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Claims 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
13 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just resuit." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In Strickland, the Court set forth a two-prong test, which 
a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
(1989). 
To establish the deficient performance prong of the Strickland test, a 
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 
286 (1986). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would 
have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999); 
Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. That is, a post-conviction applicant 
must show that his attorney's performance "so undermined the proper functioning of 
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make 
out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 
649, 873 P.2d at 903. 
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Nielson Failed To Present A Prima Facie Case Of Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel Related To Trial Counsel's Failure To Obtain A Psychological 
Evaluation To Determine Nielson's Competency 
district court concluded that Nielson failed meet burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of deficient performance and resulting prejudice 
regarding trial counsel's failure to request a competency evaluation: 
The Court will also dismiss the claim that his attorney failed to 
assist him with the continuance and/or have a mental health 
examination conducted. There is no showing that the continuance was 
prejudicial to the Defendant, and there has been no showing here that 
he lacked the mental capacity to assist in his own defense and to 
understand the proceedings .... The same is true of the Defendant's 
claim that an I.C. § 19-2523 evaluation would have changed the 
outcome of the sentencing or the outcome of the case. There is 
nothing in the record to show that Mr. Nielson is mentally ill now or in 
the past 
(#39594 R., pp.266-267.) 
Nielson challenges the district court's ruling, arguing that he had informed the 
court and his counsel that "he had recently been released from the psychiatric unit of 
the prison -- on the basis that he was not dangerous, not on the basis that he was 
not ill[,]" that "he had been given a diagnosis of schizophrenia, [and] that he had 
given his ex-wife a power of attorney to act on his behalf in conversations with 
defense counsel because he was having difficulties in communicating, and that he 
was having difficulty in organizing his thoughts and in remembering." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.20.) Contrary to Nielson's assertions, however, a review of the applicable 
law and the record supports the district court's summary dismissal as to this issue. 
Idaho law requires a trial court to order a competency evaluation when there 
is reason to doubt the defendant's competency to assist in his own defense or 
understand the proceedings. I.C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211(1). ''The test to determine 
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whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial is whether the defendant 
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him." Stone v. State, 132 Idaho 490, 492, 
975 P.2d 223, 225 · (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 
(1960); State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 842, 537 P.2d 1369, 1378 (1975)). Thus, to 
establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial 
counsel's failure to request a competency evaluation, Nielson was required to 
present facts and admissible evidence which, if taken as true, showed: 1) trial 
counsel knew or should have known that there was reason to doubt Nielson's 
competency but failed to seek a competency evaluation (Le., deficient performance); 
and 2) but for counsel's failure to seek a competency evaluation. the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different (i.e., resulting prejudice) -- by showing that, at 
the time of trial, Nielson did not have the ability to "consult with his attorney with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding," and he did not have "a rational as well 
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Stone, 132 Idaho at 492, 
975 P.2d at 225 (citations omitted). Nielson failed to carry this burden below. 
During the October 27, 2006 pre-trial hearing, Nielson informed the court that 
he had been placed in the prison mental facility after having a psychotic break, but 
was released about six weeks previously because he was not "crazy" or a danger to 
himself or others. (#40446 R., p.35.) Nielson also requested to proceed pro se, 
telling the court, 'Tm competent enough to -- in the law to represent myself, Your 
Honor. I understand the reason for an attorney." (#40446, p.28.) The court then 
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a lengthy discussion with Nielson about his mental health, his reasons 
to his appointed counsel, and his desired defenses. 
\ Aft . . I\I" I +h rt 
.1 ter engaging , .. 1e,son, .. , e cou. Nielson's the 
exchange: 
THE COURT: Do you have any reason to believe from your 
conversations with him and your experiences as an attorney in dealing 
with individuals who are, at times, mentally ill or have moments where 
they are having difficulty with their mental illness -- do you have any --
have you had any difficulty with him in understanding and carrying on 
conversations, rational and in-depth conversations with him? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor. There is no question in my 
mind he is competent to proceed today. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. Continue. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There is no question about that. 
(#40446 R., p.34.) 
The district court concluded: 
The court will find that, first and foremost, our discussion today has 
been rational, and certainly, Mr. Nielson is competent, has understood 
the court's questions and responded appropriately to questions asked 
of him. If there are psychological issues, they have not been 
demonstrated here. 
The -- I concur with [defense counsel's] observations of you, Mr. 
Nielson. You're competent -- appear to be competent to proceed. 
The -- I've instructed counsel, certainly, to get information from 
the psychiatric unit at the state penitentiary. If, in fact, there is an 
issue, Mr. Nielson -- you've said they told you you're not mentally ill 
and not incapable of -- I mean, they released you from that facility, and 
so, that speaks for itself. 
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(#40446 R., pp.36-37.) After advising Nielson of the advantages and disadvantages 
inherent in self-representation, the court determined Nielson was fully aware and 
knowledgeable of the risks, and approved his request to proceed to trial pro se. 
(#40446 R., pp.37-40.) The court then again explained the impact Nielson's 
psychiatric hospitalization had on its determination that he was competent to stand 
trial, stating: 
Certainly, I can find you're competent. The fact that this 
psychiatric hospitalization, the fact that you've been released back into 
the maximum facility -- maximum security facility does not cause this 
court to believe that you are mentally ill, both in your [sic] very 
competent and very clear understanding of these proceedings, as well 
as your contact with your lawyer, I can't find that there is -- that mental 
illness is affecting your decision here or taking away your competence. 
(#40446 R., p.40.) 
Having observed Nielson and dialogued with him personally at length, both 
Nielson's counsel and the district court concluded he was competent. The court 
noted that Nielson's release from a psychiatric hospital "speaks for itself," Le., was 
an indication Nielson was mentally healthy enough to be released. 8 Based on the 
record, and especially the colloquy between Nielson and the court, Nielson failed to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact of whether (1) he "did not have the 
ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding 
and that he did not have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him," 
8 It is unclear if Nielson is challenging the summary dismissal of his initml post-
conviction proceeding, in part, due to the "medical record from IDOC dated 
November 6, 2006, signed by Dr. Kruzich, diagnosing him as schizophrenic, possibly 
bi-polar, and suffering from anxiety." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) As Nielson states on 
appeal, that document was presented in his successive post-conviction petition --
not his initial post-conviction proceeding. (Id.) Therefore, it has no relevance, per 
se, to the summary dismissal of Nielson's initial post-conviction claim. 
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Stone, Idaho at 492, 975 P.2d at 225, (2) his trial counsel knew or should have 
was reason to doubt Nielson's competency failed to seek a 
eva even if counsel had obtained a competency 
, the outcome of the proceeding (trial or sentencing) would have been 
different. As the district court concluded, "there has been no showing here that 
[Nielson] lacked the mental capacity to assist in his own defense and to understand 
the proceedings[,]" and "[t]he same is true of [Nielson's] claim that an I.C. § 19-2523 
evaluation would have changed the outcome of the sentencing or the outcome of the 
case." (#39594 R., pp.266-267.). 
Further, the record shows it would have been pointless for Nielson's trial 
counsel to have requested a competency evaluation. Between October 27, 2006, 
and November 13, 2006 -- the first day of trial -- Nielson represented himself. On 
the first day of trial, while still acting prose, Nielson moved for a continuance on the 
basis that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia by Dr. Kruzich, and was not 
competent to prepare and assist in his own defense, or to represent himself. 
(#40446 R., p.43.) The court immediately denied Nielson's motion for a continuance 
upon learning from Nielson that he did not have a signed letter from Dr. Kruzich to 
confirm his mental condition. (#40446 R., p.43.) Shortly after that ruling, Nielson 
requested his stand-by counsel be re-appointed as his regular trial counsel, and the 
court granted his request. (#40446, p.45.) It could not have been lost on Nielson's 
trial counsel that, just prior to being re-appointed, the court denied Nielson's pro se 
request for a continuance that was based on his mental health claims. A motion for 
a competency evaluation would have been futile absent some new information 
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causing trial counsel to doubt Nielson's competency. Nielson's trial counsel cannot 
have been ineffective for failing to make such an untenable motion prior to trial. See 
Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 501, 700 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Counsel 
is not ineffective for failing to raise an issue upon which he could not succeed.") 
Even after the jury returned its verdict, the court demonstrated an unwillingness to 
conduct further evaluations on Nielson, as evidenced by the court's refusal to 
approve Nielson's trial counsel's request for a psychosexual evaluation and 
explanation that it was "not going to order an evaluation at public expense in light of 
the extensive record this man has regarding this particular offense." (#40446, 
pp.111-112.) 
There was nothing presented in Nielson's initial post-conviction proceeding 
that demonstrated any demeanor or behavior on Nielson's part at trial to warrant a 
finding that his trial counsel knew or shouid have known there was reason to doubt 
Nielson's competency. See State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 778, 229 P.3d 379, 
384 (Ct. App. 2009). Although Nielson alleged he had been hospitalized for 
psychiatric problems in the past and was diagnosed with having schizophrenia, he 
failed to support those factual assertions with admissible evidence in that 
proceeding. Ferrier, 135 Idaho at 799, 25 P.3d at 112; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 
873 P.2d at 901. Perhaps most importantly, under the prejudice requirement of 
Strickland, Nielson fails to present any evidence to substantiate his bare and 
conclusory claim that, if his trial counsel had requested a competency evaluation, 
"[t]he trial would have been postponed to allow the evaluation and it is reasonably 
probable that Mr. Nielson would have been found incompetent to proceed" 
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(Appellant's Brief, p.22), and also to explain how a competency evaluation 
would have resulted in a lesser sentence (see id., pp.19-22). 
Because the record contains nothing more than N 's bare 
conciusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, and because the claim is 
disproven by the record, Nielson has failed to show that the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a 
competency evaluation prior to trial and sentencing. 
11. 
Nielson Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Successive 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Nielson filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, asserting his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve, for appeal, a challenge to the trial 
court's ruling that it would allow the state to present evidence of Nielson's prior bad 
acts under I.RE. 404(b) in the event Nielson testified, which ruling, Nielson argues, 
effectively denied him his right to testify. (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-31.) Nielson 
specifically contends his trial counsel failed to preserve the 404(b) issue for appeal 
by not making an offer of proof as to what Nielson's trial testimony would be. (Id.) 
Further, Nielson argues that because his counsel in his initial post-conviction 
proceeding neglected to add that claim to the amended post-conviction petition, he 
is excused from not having presented it previously. Nielson has failed to show the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing his successive post-conviction petition. 
21 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine 1Nhether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007). 
C. Nielson Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His 
Successive Petition 
"A successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if 
the grounds for relief were finally adjudicated or waived in the previous post-
conviction proceeding. I.C. § 19--4908."9 Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 
P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006). "Such grounds may be re-litigated, however, if the 
petitioner shows sufficient reason why they were inadequately presented in the 
original case." kt Although ineffective assistance of counsel in an original post-
conviction action "is not grounds for post-conviction relief, an allegation that a claim 
was not adequately presented in the first post-conviction action due to the deficiency 
of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason to permit the 
claims to be presented again in a subsequent petition." 19..: (citations omitted). 
Where a petition alleges ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as a 
basis for bringing a successive petition, the relevant inquiry is "whether the second 
application has raised not merely a question of counsel's performance but 
substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence." Nguyen v. State, 
9 The general legal standards regarding post-conviction proceedings and ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims have been set forth in Sections 1-C and 1-D of this brief, 
and need not be repeated here. 
22 
126 Idaho 494, 496, 887 P.2d 39, 41 1994) (quoting Wolfe v. State, 113 
Idaho 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 1987)) to overcome summary 
dismissal of the assistance in successive petition, Nielson \.Vas 
required to allege facts that, if accepted as true, showed both (1) that the claim was 
either not raised or was inadequately asserted in his original post-conviction action 
due to the ineffective assistance of his original post-conviction attorney, and (2) a 
meritorious underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Nielson failed 
to carry his burden. 
The district court summarily dismissed Nielson's successive post-conviction 
claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to make an offer 
of proof about Nielson's testimony which have preserved a challenge to the 
trial court's 404(b) ruling for direct appeal. In doing so, the district court correctly 
determined that the issue of whether the claim could be raised in a successive 
petition (due to the alleged failure of Nielson's first post-conviction counsel to present 
it previously) ultimately depended on whether an offer of proof by trial counsel would 
have resulted in a successful challenge to the court's 404(b) ruling on direct appeal. 
The district court's well-reasoned decision, based on its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 
attached as Appendix A, is incorporated to this Respondent's Brief and relied upon 
as if fully set forth herein. (Appendix A; see #40446 R., pp.420-421 (Judgment 
incorporating Notice of Intent to Dismiss as reasons for dismissal).) 
In short, the district court concluded that inasmuch as there was no merit to 
Nielson's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the 404(b) 
issue for appeal, Nielson's "initial post-conviction counsel was not ineffective for 
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failing to raise, as an issue in the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, trial 
counsel's failure to make an offer of proof regarding [Nielson's) testimony at trial." 
(#40446 R., p.162; Appendix A, p.9.) Therefore, the court (imp!icit!y) ru!ed that 
Nielson's 404(b)-based ineffectiveness claim was barred from being presented in a 
successive petition. (#40446 R., p.160; Appendix A, p.7 (successive petition claim is 
barred unless Nielson's initial post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise the claim earlier).) 
In addition to the district court's reasoning, there is another compelling reason 
Nielson fails now, as he did be!ow, to show his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to preserve a challenge to the trial court's 404(b) ruling for direct appeal. Nielson's 
argument supposes that the trial court's ruling, and in turn, his conviction, would 
have been reversed under Grist, which tightened the rules regarding the 
admissibility of 404(b) evidence in child sex abuse cases, and reversed long-
standing Idaho law. Grist overruled State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 
(1991) (and State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992)), to the extent 
Moore stood for the proposition that uncharged misconduct in a child sex abuse 
case could be admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) when the probative value of the 
evidence was entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's 
propensity to engage in such behavior. 10 Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190 
10 The Grist decision went on, however, to point out that prior bad act evidence can 
be admissible to corroborate or show a common plan or scheme. Grist, 147 Idaho at 
54-55, 205 P.3d at 1190-91. The Court cautioned that district courts should 
scrutinize whether evidence offered to show corroboration or common scheme or 
plan "actually serves the articulated purpose or whether such evidence is merely 
propensity evidence served up under a different name." Isl at 55, 205 P.3d at 1191. 
In so cautioning, the Court nonetheless endorsed as correct its statement in State v. 
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unstated premise Moore is simply this: 'If he did it 
as well.' This complete upon propensity is 
admission of evidence uncharged 
he probably did it 
a permissible basis 
The flaw in 
Nielson's argument is that the Grist decision was issued January 29, 2009, and 
Nielson's jury trial took place in November 2006. Compare Grist, 147 Idaho at 49, 
205 P.3d at 1185 with #33823 R., p 59 (Verdict dated 11/14/2006). Therefore, 
Nielson's argument is based on finding fault with his trial counsel for failing to 
preserve an issue for appeal that had no legal basis until over two years later. The 
law does not embrace such a claim. 
A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the alleged 
error, not in hindsight, and presumes that "trial counsel was competent and that trial 
tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 
948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680-681). Trial counsel's 
strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a 
basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless the 
petitioner has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. 
Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunningham v. State, 
117 Idaho 428, 430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). In Hoskins v. State, 
149 Idaho 815, 818-819, 242 P.3d 185, 188-189 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals rejected an argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file 
Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 746, 819 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1991): "[w]here relevant to the 
credibility of the parties, evidence of a common criminal design is admissible." Grist, 
147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190. 
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motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his vehicie, 
based on the United States Supreme Court's subsequent ruiing in Arizona v. Gant, 
556 U.S. 332 (2009), 11 stating: 
It appears that if the standards announced in Gant were applied, 
a suppression motion might have merit in Hoskins' case. That does 
not mean, however, that Hoskins has shown that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment entitles 
criminal defendants to reasonably competent counsel, but not perfect 
or prescient counsel. Brown v. United States, 311 F.3d 875, 878 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that counsel's performance was not deficient for 
failing to predict future developments in the law); Nelson v. Estelle, 642 
F.2d 903, 908 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[C]ounsel is normally not expected to 
foresee future new developments in the law .... "); Schoger v. State, 148 
Idaho 622, 630, 226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (2010) (observing that only in a 
very rare case would counsel's performance be deemed ineffective for 
failing to make an objection that would have been overruled under 
then-prevailing law). 
Accordingly, Nielson has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel provided 
deficient performance by failing to be prescient about the Idaho Supreme Court's 
ruling in Grist and preserve for direct appeal a challenge to the district court's 404(b) 
ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that, in Supreme Court Docket No. 39594, this 
Court affirm the district court's order summarily dismissing Nielson's claim that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a psychological evaluation to 
determine Nielson's competency prior to trial and sentencing, and in Supreme Court 
11 Gant rejected a broad reading of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), 
regarding law enforcement searches of passenger compartments of vehicles 
incident to the arrest of an occupant. Gant, 556 U.S. 332. 
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Docket 40446, that this Court affirm the 
Nielson's successive post-conviction petition. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DENNIS L. NIELSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent. 
Case No. CVPC 12-12145 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
DISMISS SUCCESSIVE 
PETITION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b), this Court hereby notifies the above parties 
of its intention to dismiss Petitioner's successive application for post-conviction relief in 
the above-captioned case. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This action under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Idaho Code 
§§ 19-4.901 through 19-4911, is before the Court on Petitioner's request for an 
evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), the Court, having considered the 
application and the record, is satisfied that Petitioner is not .entitled to post-conviction 
relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Petitioner will have 





Dennis Nielson was convicted by a jury of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child 
Under the Age of Sixteen, a violation of I.C.§ 18-1508, and a judgment of conviction 
entered on January 3, 2007. The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of conviction in 
an unpublished decision issued August 1, 2008. State v. Dennis Nielson, Docket No. 
33823, Unpublished Opinion (Ct. App. August 1, 2008). 
On November 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 
Counsel was appointed to assist Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel filed an Amended 
Petition on August 23, 2010. Respondent filed an untimely Answer on November 3, 
20101 and a motion for summary dismissal on December 27, 2010. 
The District Court summarily dismissed all of Petitioner's claims in Petitioner's 
Amended Petition. See January 26, 2012 Judgment, dismissing all of Petitioner's 
claims for post-conviction relief with prejudice. Petitioner filed a timely appeal. 
On July 10, 2012, Petitioner filed a successive petition pro se. Counsel was 
subsequently appointed to represent Petitioner and a status hearing was held on 
August 24, 2012. The Court ordered that any Amended (Successive) Petition be filed 
by September 15, 2012. As of the date of this Notice of Intent to Dismiss, no Amended 
(Successive) Petition has been filed. 
1 The.~ling of an untimely Answer does not prevent summary dismissal of the petition. Bjorklund v. State, 
130 Idaho 373, 377-78, 941 P.2d 345, 350-51 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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Ill. 
LAW ON SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS 
Petitioner may not raise any claim in a successive petition that he raised or could 
have raised in a prior post-conviction petition. l.C. §19-4908. A successive petition for 
post-conviction relief is only allowed where the court "finds a ground for relief asserted 
[in a successive application] which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application.'' Id. 
Although a claim of ineffective post-conviction counsel, standing alone, is not 
grounds for post-conviction relief, an allegation that a claim was not asserted or 
inadequately raised in the first post-conviction petition due to the deficiency of prior 
post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason to permit the claims to be 
presented in a subsequent petition. Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 595-96, 635 
P.2d 955, 959-60 (19~1) (emphasis added). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Petitioner's First Post-Conviction Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Declining 
to Raise a Futile Claim 
In his successive Petition, Petitioner argues that his first post-conviction counsel 
was ineffective for failing to allege that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make an 
offer of proof regarding what Petitioner Nielson would have testified to at trial "had he 
been allowed to testify on his own behalf." Verified Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, p.3, paragraph 20. 
Petitioner's argument fails as a matter of law. Petitioner's argument in his 
NOTICE-3 000156 
post-conviction petition is like a matryoshka, a Russian nesting-doll. 
argument requires Court to make additional unsupported inferences on 
behalf. Petitioner's argument fails at each level; however, the best 
for understanding the embedded arguments is to begin at the core. 
At its core, Petitioner's argument rests on a general claim that "his fundamental 
right to testify on his own behalf' was violated. Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
p.9, filed September 29, 2010. Specifically, Petitioner claimed that he was 
prevented from testifying by the district court's evidentiary ruling that the State would be 
permitted to introduce other acts evidence, pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), should Petitioner 
take the stand and testify on his own behalf. Related to this claim was Petitioner's 
argument, raised in his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, that appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court's I.R.E. 404(b) ruling. Id. 
In its (first) Memorandum Decision, the District Court determined that it would 
hear evidence on the failure of appellate counsel to appeal the trial court's evidentiary 
ruling. Memorandum Decision, p.4., filed March 11, 2011. The District Court did not 
specifically address Petitioner's argument that he was denied his right to testify on his 
own behalf by the District Court's evidentiary ruling. 
The fact that the District Court did not specifically address this argument is of no 
consequence. Petitioner was not denied his right to testify on his own behalf by the 
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Petitioner waived testify.2 Demyers v. 
2 The District Court had the following exchange with Petitioner at trial: 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Nielson, have you had an opportunity to discuss with Mr. Odessey 
the question of whether or not you take the witness stand in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT: I have. 
THE COURT: All right. Have you had a full and fair opportunity to meet with him and discuss 
that with him? 
THE DEFENDANT: I believe under the circumstances that I have. 
THE COURT: "Under the circumstances." You mean just your decision to meet with him - or to 
have him represent you yesterday? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. And we have spoke for a few minutes here and there about my 
testimony. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: And what I understand about your ruling this morning, I think that, if it stands 
that way, then it's in my best interest, from what I understand, to not testify. 
THE COURT: Well, No. 1, I would give you additional time if you had additional questions of your 
lawyer here today. Do you need additional time to confer with Mr. Odessey about this issue? 
THE DEFENDANT: That could be helpful. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll take a recess. Let's - let's go ahead and let the jury - we'll let them 
know that we're going to be taking a lunch break, I think, at this point in time, but hold off just for a 
moment. Let's go to - ['m going to give you additional time to confer with your attorney on this question. 
Jury trial transcript, p.265, L 19 - p.266, L.24. 
Later, the following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: All right. Give us a moment. Have you had a chance to confer with Mr. Nielson 
about his testifying? 
MR. ODESSEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did - Mr. Nielson, have you had a chance to confer with Mr. Odessey? 
THE DEFENDANT: I .have. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions of him? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Is it your position at this time that you wish not to testify at this trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And you have that right under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. I'm sure Mr. Odessey went over with you that if you do testify, you can present to the jury 
your version of the facts. Again, the state has the right to cross-examine you. And you're correct in your 
understanding that if you were to be placed on the witness stand, the state could inquire of you as to prior 
admissions on your part on the two prior- three prior Land Lor injury to child cases. You understand all 
of that; correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: All right. So, at this time, based upon your review of the case and the questions 
you've asked of your attorney and the advice he has given you, it is your choice, at this time, to not testify 
in this case; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's correct. · 
Jury trial transcript, p.288, L.8 - p.289, L.12. 
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Adams, 47 Fed. ,.l\ppx. 454 (9th Cir. 2002) (Where Defendant remained si!ent in the face 
of her attorney's decision not to call her as a witness, she waived her right to testify); 
United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 445, 446-47 (91h Cir. 1990) ("To hold that a 
defendant may abide his lawyer's advice not to take the stand and then invalidate the 
trial because he so acted is not fair to the government."); State v. Richardson, 670 
N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2008) (trial court's evidentiary ruling that Defendant's prior 
misconduct could be used to impeach him if he testified did not deprive him of his right 
to testify). 
After additional briefing, the District Court correctly concluded that it would be 
proper to summarily dismiss the claim regarding ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel for failing to appeal the trial court's I.RE 404(b) ruling. The District Court 
provided notice of its intent to dismiss this claim in its (second) Memorandum Decision, 
noting that, at trial, Petitioner had failed to make an offer of proof regarding what his 
testimony would have been, had he taken the stand to testify in his own defense, and 
had thus failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. Memorandum Decision, 
pp.11-13, filed November 2, 2011. 
Predictably, in light of the District Court's decision summarily dismissing his claim 
for failure to preserve an appellate issue, Petitioner now wishes to allege that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve that appellate issue by making an offer of 
proof regarding what Petitioner's trial testimony would have been, had Petitioner taken 
the stand. However, because trial counsel's failure to make an offer of proof was known 
at the time that Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner 
is barred from raising this claim under I. C. § 19-4908. ("All grounds for relief available to 
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an in or amended 
application.") 
Because Petitioner is barred from attacking his trial counsel's performance in a 
successive petition, where the claim against trial counsel was known or should have 
been known at the time of the filing of the Amended Petition, Petitioner attempts to 
pursue his only apparent recourse: attacking the performance of his post-conviction 
counsel for failure to raise, in the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction relief, the 
allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve an appellate issue by 
making an offer of proof regarding what Petitioner's testimony would have been, had 
Petitioner decided to testify at trial. 
Petitioner's claim in his successive Petition that his first post-conviction counsel 
was ineffective for failing to raise, as an issue in the Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction relief, trial counsel's failure to make an offer of proof, fails as a matter of law. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the post-conviction 
petitioner has the burden to show: (1) that his attorney's performance was deficient, and 
(2) that he or she was thereby prejudiced in the defense of the criminal charge. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To show deficient performance, a defendant must 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by 
demonstrating "that counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of 
competence." Roman, 125 Idaho at 648-49, 873 P.2d at 902-03. See a/so Vick v. State, 
131 Idaho 121, 124, 952 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998). If a defendant succeeds in 
establishing that counsei's performance was deficient, he or she must also prove the 
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prejudice element by showing that "there ls a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the resutt of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. 
The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffectiveness is "whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Id. at 686. When evaluating 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, strategic and tactical choices should not be 
second-guessed. Id. It is presumed that counsel is competent and that trial tactics were 
based on sound legal strategy. Id. To withstand a motion for summary dismissal of an 
ineffective assistance claim, the claimant must allege a material issue of fact exists as 
to both prongs of the two-part test. See Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 
709 (1992). 
Under the legal test set forth above, Petitioner would have to show that, if his first 
post-conviction counsel had alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make 
an offer of proof, this argument would have changed the outcome. In other words, to 
prevail on his claim in his successive petition, Petitioner must show that the District 
Court would have granted his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to make an offer of proof. Petitioner cannot meet this 
burden. 
The District Court would not have found that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to make an offer of proof. For the District Court to have reached this conclusion, 
it woul~ have had to engage in the Strickland analysis set forth above, which would 
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to find of the ( 1) if trial counsel 
had made an offer of proof regarding the Defendant's testimony, properly preserving 
this issue for appeal, appellate counsel would have raised the trial court's I.RE. 404(b) 
ruling on appeal; (2) if appellate counsel had raised the trial court's I.RE. 404(b) ruling 
on appeal, the appellate court would have found that the trial court abused its discretion 
in permitting the State to introduce other acts evidence as impeachment; (3) as a result 
of the trial court's abuse of discretion, Petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right 
to testify; (4) but for the Petitioner's deprivation of his right to testify through the trial 
court's evidentiary ruling, the Petitioner would have testified; (5) if Petitioner had 
testified, the jury would have acquitted him. 
This Court finds that there is no admissible evidence supporting any of the logical 
leaps that are necessary for Petitioner to prevail on his successive Post-Conviction 
Petition. To the contrary, even if appellate counsel would have raised the trial court's 
I. R. E. 404(b) ruling as an issue on appeal, it is highly unlikely that an appellate court 
~ould have overturned the District Court's well-reasoned ruling. Even if an appellate 
court did find that the District Court abused its discretion (in the I.RE. 403 balancing) in 
permitting relevant other acts evidence to impeach the Petitioner, there is no reason to 
believe that this would have resulted in the appellate court overturning the conviction. 
This Court finds that Petitioner's initial post-conviction counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to raise, as an issue in the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, trial 
counsel's failure to make an offer of proof regarding Petitioner's testimony at trial. 
Petitioner cannot show deficient performance or prejudice related to this claimed failure. 
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8. Petitioner's Allegation that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Not Asking for 
a Competency Evaluation Is Barred Under I.C. §19~4908 and Will Be 
Summarily Dismissed 
In his Successive Petition, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for not asking the court for a competency evaluation. Verified Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, p.2, paragraph 16. This claim was raised in his Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and adjudicated. See District Court's Memorandum 
Decision on the State's Motion to Dismiss, pp.3-4, filed March 11, 2011. Because this 
claim was raised in Petitioner's Amended Post-Conviction Petition, and was previously 
adjudicated by the District Court, Petitioner is barred by LC. §19-4908 from raising this 
same claim for a second time in a successive petition. This claim will be dismissed 
without an evidentiary hearing. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner has not raised any claims in his successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
that would entitle him to relief. His claim that his initial post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective fails because he can show neither deficient performance nor prejudice. His 
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to order a competency evaluation 
has been previously adjudicated and is barred pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. 
Petitioner is hereby granted twenty (20) days to reply to the proposed dismissal 
of this action. In light of the reply, or on default thereof, the court may order the 
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application dismissed or grant leave to file a second amended application, or direct that 
the proceedings otherwise continue. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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